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of the Tribunals, as well as by the Maltese Lawyers practising in 
that court, to put things right wherever justice and equity so re-
quired. Many illustrious Maltese lawyers such as Chapelle, Bona-
vita, Torregiani, Calcedonio Debono and Giovanni Nicolo Zammit 
took part in its proceedings. The Magistrato, or the later Tribu-
nale, was a true and proper prize court administering the law of 
nations as then .already acknowledged by enlightened international 
legal opinion, and especially as recognised by the relevant provi-
sions of the Code de Rohan. The records of the corsair courts of 
Malta, if we may call them so, are still excellently preserved in 
local archives. They provide reliable evidence of the understand-
ing and appreciation of this branch of the law in Malta even in 
those far off, swashbuckling times. 
DOCTORS AND WOULD-BE DOCTORS 
IN THE LAW REPORTS 
By courtesy of t/Je Editor, St. Luke's Hospital Gazette 
J.J. CREMONA 
This paper is the St. Luke's Day Oration delivered to the Malta 
Branch of .the British Medical Association on the 18th October 
1973 at. the Medical School of the University. 
DOCTORS. (and, following the order in the title of this lecture, I 
shall come to. would-be doctors later) figure in our law reports in 
several guises - as plaintiffs or defendants in civil actions, as 
persons charged in criminal actions, as witnesses and, lastly and 
more commonly, as experts. For the purposes of this lecture, I am 
confining my interest to doctors qua doctors as otherwise there are, 
of course, numerous instances of doctors figuring in the law reports 
as ordinary litigants. Obviously there is nothing to preclude doc-
tors from joining in this national pastime which is court litigation 
and, as I said, there are several reported cases of doctors, even 
some of the most reputable ones, suing or being sued for damages 
in connection with traffic accidents, whereas in relation to traffic 
accidents I am obviously more concerned with doctors as experts 
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assessing, for instance, (and this is by no means easy) the per-
centage of an injured person's permanent incapacity for the pur-
poses of an action for damages. 
I should like to start with a famous civil case in which a doctor 
unfortunately figures as defendant and I should like to do so be-
cause the case is concerned with the fundamental question of a 
doctor's responsibility arising out of the carrying out of his pro-
fessional duties. The case, which is in the Law Reports (Vol. 
XXXV, Part 2, pages 55-56), was decided by the Court of Appeal 
on the 2nd April 1951. In this case a father, on behalf of his son 
under age, sued a doctor for damages arising out of the fact that 
the son, who was under the professional care of the doctor, alleged-
ly through the doctor's negligence, lost his foot and suffered per-
manent debilitation . Warrants of seizure and of impediment of de-
parture, as well as a garnishee order, were also issued against the 
doctor. 
The facts of the case were as follows. On the 18th March 1944 
the doctor performed an operation on the boy's foot, which had been 
paralysed through poliomyelitis. Next day the doctor visited the 
patient and, as he stated in evidence, found everythin~ normal. He 
failed to visit him on the 20th but on the 21st he did visit him, 
after having first declined, on the insistence of the person who 
called him and he found the boy flushed and feverish. Again on the 
22nd he failed to see the boy and on the 23rd the boy's mother took 
him to the doctor's house. The doctor tore open the bandage and, 
after some . medication, applied another bandage on everything 
there was. On the 25th the boy's mother again went to the doctor 
and informed him that the exposed part of one of the toes there was 
a blister. Notwithstanding this information, the doctor failed to go 
and see the boy. From the 26th onwards the mother started taking 
the boy to the doctor daily and the doctor continued to treat him re-
gularly till August of the same year when the boy's foot, gangren-
ous and mummified, dropped off spontaneously as Professor Peter 
Paul Debono, to whom the boy's family had tumed, was uncovering 
it. The medical experts appointed by the Court reached the con-
clusion in their report that the gangrenous process had begun from 
one to two days after the operation, that is to say between the 19th 
and 20th March, and continued on its normal course till the foot's 
spontaneous amputation four months later and that the position 
could have been remedied bad the doctor become aware of it in 
time. They said that in this case gangrene was occasioned by the 
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pressure of the plaster bandage, which seriously obstructed the 
circulation, added that it was to be expected that after such an 
operation the foot should swell and the bandage consequently 
tighten. They admitted that the doctor had not noticed the condi-
tion of the boy's foot in those first days after the operation, but 
felt that this was. due to a professional error of judgment, an error 
in the interpretation of clinical facts, and that this error was not 
due to negligence. 
Both the court of first instance and the Court of Appeal, however, 
disagreed with the experts' conclusion that there was no negligence, 
and this on the basis of the statements of the experts themselves. 
It was remarked in the judgment that, according to the experts them-
selves, the critical period was between the 19th and the 23rd and 
during this period the doctor had failed to see the patient on the 
20th and the 22nd, and it was only on the insistence of a certain 
person that he went to see him on the 21st. The experts themselves 
stated in their evidence that common prudence did in fact suggest 
that the doctor should have seen the boy also on the 20th and add-
ed that in the period between the 20th and the 23rd the doctor 
should have gone to see the boy irrespective of any symptomatology 
which the boy presented on the 20th, but by reason only of the fact 
that the operation had taken place on the 18th, considering the na-
ture of the operation itself. The experts themselves also stated 
that in this period between the 20th and the 23rd the symptoms, es-
pecially local ones, increased in severity and this should have 
caused the doctor to become aware of the gangrenous process, had 
he in fact gone to see his patient. Indeed, as I said, it was on the 
basis of the experts' findings themselves that both Courts reached 
the clear conclusion that there had been negligence on the part of 
the doctor. 
The Court of Appeal agreed with the Court below that on the 
facts as established the doctor had not used the diligence of a bo-
nus paterfamilias and had shown imprudence in not having contin~ 
ually kept, as he should have done, an eye on ·the patient in the 
days after the operation when the danger of gangrene was so much 
present and could have been avoided by his attention. He was thus 
at fault and was responsible for the consequences. 
The Court of Appeal, quoting from Italian and French text-writ-
ers, held that it was clear from the authorities and the decided 
cases that a doctor was not responsible for damage~ resulting from 
an excusable professional error and this was excusable if it stem-
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med from the uncertainties and imperfections of the sciences and 
not from negligence or sheer incapacity. But the position was, of 
course, different if the error was, as the Court put it, grossolano, 
which, literally translated, means 'coarse', or if the damage was 
attributable to his not showing che prudence, diligence and atten-
tion of a bonus paterfamilias, which, as you know, is the ordinary 
standard of care required by our law. This proposition, as indeed 
also the writ of summons itself, was based on the basic provisions 
of Sections 1074 and 1075 of the Civil Code, which provide that 
'every person. • • shall be liable for the damage which occurs 
through his fault' and chat 'a person shall be deemed to be ac fault 
if, in his own acts, he does not use the prudence, diligence and at-
tention of a bonus paterfamilias but 'no person shall, in the ab-
sence of an express provision of the law, be liable for any damage 
caused by wane of prudence, diligence of attention in a higher deg-
ree'. 
Another class of reported cases in which doctors figure, chis 
time as plaintiffs, in civil suits and which illustrate the eternal 
hazards of credit, relate co doctors' actions for the payment of pro-
fessional fees. First of all, as you know, there is prescription, 
which is here used not as a medical term but as a Maltese and 
Continental legal term denoting one of the causes of extinction of 
obligations (by lapse of time) which is in general justified by the 
social ·necessity of ensuring the certainty of juridical relationships, 
but - and I quite realize chis - can be also most infuriating. On 
the ocher hand, the running of prescriptive time may in some cases 
be suspended or interrupted. Procedurally prescription is a defence 
against an action and in civil matters cannot be raised by the Court 
of its own motion, but unfortunately is quite often cheeffully raised 
by the defendant, and this at any stage of the proceedings, even on 
appeal. One of the facts of life of universal application is that 
there is very little enthusiasm for payment, at least when one is at 
the paying end. No doubt you all know that, according to law, ac-
tions by physicians, surgeons and obstetricians to get payment for 
their visits or operations are barred by the lapse of two years. So 
please beware. 
I am now thinking of one particular doctor (whose case, decided 
by the First Hall of the Civil Court in 1928, figures in Vol. XXVII, 
Part 2 pages 53-55 of the Law Reports) who must have found the 
defence that was set up against his action for the payment of pro-
fessional fees perhaps much more disconcerting than just prescrip-
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tion. The patient, defendant in the suit, did not contest the fact 
that he had called the doctor to make use of his professional ser-
vices, nor indeed did he contest the bill. His defence was only that 
the treatment which the doctor had given him, notwithstanding the 
doctor's repeated assurances that it would have been efficacious, 
had not produced the anticipated effect and that in fact he was 
worse. He added that he would not have entrusted his case to the 
doctor if he had not assured him about the result of the treatment, 
and in fact he had told the doctor not to start the treatment if he 
did not feel certain of its efficacy. It was established that the 
treatment had negative results and Professor Peter Paul Debono 
expressed the opinion that the patient's illness was incurable. 
The Court in this delicate case had regard to the relevant cir-
cumstances. It held that it was clear that the payment of a doc· 
tor's professionai fees could not be subjected to the condition of 
the patient's recovery, notwithstanding the doctor's assurances 
and expressions of confidence in the result of the treatment which, 
rightly or wrongly, he thought would be conducive to recovery, pro· 
vided - and this is a very important proviso - there was nc evident 
bad faith or evident abuse of the exercise of his profession on the 
part of the doctor. In this case, bad faith, the Court said, 'could 
not be presumed solely from the negative result of the treatment or 
Professor Debona' s opinion that the patient's i1lness was incur-
able'. The case was, of course, decided on its own merits, due al-
lowance being made for the possibility in other circumstances of 
the presence of bad faith or abuse in the exercise of the profes-
sion, and this is quite understandable. 
As I said, the Law Reports also show some interesting cases of 
doctors as defendants in criminal cases. I should like in the first 
place to refer to a reported case decided in 1917 which concerned 
a charge against a Sliema doctor of having refused to give his pro-
fessional services when called upon so to do in an urgent case and 
which indeed relates to what is often an agonizing situation for a 
medical practitioner (Law Reports, Vol. XXIII, Part 1, pages 1083-
1086). As you know, the Medical and Kindred Professions Ordin-
ance (Chap. 51) provides in section 6 that it is the duty of every 
licensed medical practitioner to practise his profession whenever 
he is so required in cases of urgency, whether by day or by night, 
and without .any wilful delay to render his aid and prescribe the ne-
cessary remedies. The Ordinance also prescribes penalties for of-
fences against this provision. 
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The facts of this particular case were as follows. In the early 
hours of the 19th August 1917 a man was roused from his slumbers 
by a kind-hearted woman who told him that another woman, a neigh· 
bour, was ill and she asked for his help. He found the sick woman 
so ill that he called a priest and the priest suggested that he should 
call a doctor. He then embarked on a series of fruitless peregrina-
tions. Having gone first to one doctor with negative result, be then 
went to the doctor concerned in this case, making known to the 
person who peeped out of the window the object of his visit and 
the urgency of the case, but was informed by that person that the 
doctor could not attend to the case as he had only shortly come 
home. After having unsuccessfully sought another doctor at his re-
sidence and · also unsuccessfully requested the address of another 
from the duty police officer, the man went again to the doctor con· 
cerned, but again with negative results. Then he went, again un-
successfully, to call another doctor. The net result was that up to 
six o'clock in the morning no doctor had gone to see this woman. 
In court the doctor concerned pleaded in justification indisposition 
resulting from tiredness which necessitated rest. The Court of Ma· 
gistrates held that, according to the teachings of jurists, the rea-
son justifying a doctor's refusal to give his professional services 
when so required in cases of urgency had to be grave, and that not 
only had this doctor failed to show sufficient justification for his 
refusal, but the evidence showed that his defence was groundless. 
On appeal by the doctor, the appellate Court affirmed the judgment. 
It observed that the conditions for the existence of the contraven-
tion in question were, first, the urgency of the case in connection 
with which a licensed doctor is required to give his professional 
services and, secondly, the unreasonableness of his rtfusal to do 
so. The Court added that one could only adjudicate upon the urgen· 
cy of the request on the basis of the circumstances antecedent to 
or concomitant with the request itself, that is to say on the basis 
of the circumstances in which the case presented itself and not of 
the subsequent circumstances; these might conceivably disclose 
that the apprehended urgency did not as such exist whereas it could 
be shown that the circumstances themselves did in fact justify at 
the time the apprehension of that urgency. With regard to the second 
point, the Court said that, in order to decide on the reasonableness 
or otherwise of the doctor's refusal, it was necessary to have re· 
gard to the ground for the refusal, the ascertainment of the exis· 
tence of such ground and its appreciation being left to the Court. 
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Quoting from the French legal writers Chauveau and Helie, the 
Court made it clear that the assessment of such ground could not 
indeed be left to the individual appreciation of the practitioner to 
whom the request was made. Obviously this is a very delicate mat-
ter involving a fine appreciation of all relevant factors. 
Other reported cases in this class relate to another important du-
ty of medical practitioners under the Prevention of Disease Ordin-
ance (Chap. 59). Section 5 of this Ordinance provides as follows: 
Every medical practitioner attending on or called in to visit a pa-
tient shall forthwith, on becoming aware that the patient is suffer-
ing from a disease to which this part of the Ordinance applies, send 
to the Superintendent a certificate stating the name, age and ad-
dress of the patient, and the disease from which, in the opinion of 
such medical practitioner, the patient is suffering'. This provision, 
according to Section 38 of the same Ordinance with which it must 
be read, applies even where there exists only. a reasonable suspi-
cion that the disease is one of those specified in the said Section 
38. A cade of a charge under this Ordinance against a medical prac-
titioner came before the Court of Magistrates in 1938. It did not 
present much difficulty from the evidential point of view. In this 
case, reported in Vol. XXX, Part 1, pages 543-549 of the Law Re-
ports, it was established in evidence that the doctor, who had a 
sick child under his care, actually declared to the child's mother 
that the case was one of diphtheria, gave the child several injec-
tions of anti-diphtheria serum, warned the child's parents to say 
nothing about case, created in them the fear that they would be ar-
rested if they talked and stating that if he was caught he would be 
fined twenty pounds, asked them to hide the empty phials, advised 
them to remove their young daughter from the house, warned them 
not to admit anybody into the house and, notwithstanding all this, 
sent no certificate to the Sanitary Authorities and then expected to 
get away with it in Court. It is riot surprising in the circumstances 
that when he took the witness stand he only made his posiciol\ 
worse. 
The case is interesting only because it involved an important 
question about prescription. We have seen that prescription, as a 
cause of extinction of civil obligations is not too friendly to the 
medical practitioner who is a little remiss in sending his bills. But 
in a criminal case, on the other hand, prescription can only operate 
in favour of the person charged, in this case the medical practition-
er concerned. The Court of Magistrates accepted the doctor's plea, 
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as it held that the doctor had declared the child to be suffering from 
diphtheria on the 20th December 1937 and the summons had been 
served on him on the 22nd March 1938, that is to say more than 
three months after the commission of the contravention. As in such 
cases the prescriptive period is 3 months the criminal action was 
thus barred by prescription and the doctor was acquitted. On ap-
peal by the Attorney-General, however, the appellate Court revers-
ed the judgment, found the doctor guilty and fined him. It held that 
the offence in question was a continuing one, that is to say one in 
which the course of action continues de die di.em, and in· such cas- · 
es the prescriptive period only commences to run on the day when 
the violation of the law ceases. In this case the appellate Court 
held that the permanence of the anti-juridical state ceased with the 
child's death, so as long as the child remained alive the doctor was 
still violating the law in not giving the prescribed notice. The boy 
died on the 23rd December 1937 at two o'clock in the morning, and 
the summons was served on the doctor on th~ 22nd March 1938. The 
criminal action against the doctor stood, saved probably to the 
doctor's bitter disappointment, by just a narrow margin. Another 
question in connection with a charge against a doctor under this 
section arose in a reported case of 1954 (Vol. XXXVIII, Part IV, 
pages 786-788 of the Law Reports). The doctor concerned submit-
ted through his counsel that the provision in question was not to 
be construed as imposing a duty to send the prescribed certificate 
on each doctor having the patient under his care or called to visit 
him. It was contended on behalf of the doctor that it was sufficient 
if only one doctor sent the certificate in cases, like the one in 
question, of a consultation where there was thus more than one 
doctor involved. The Court - and its view was endorsed by the ap-
pellate Court - was unable to accept this contention in view of 
the clear wording of the law which, after all, was also consonant 
with the ratio legis in as much as otherwise, in the case of a plu-
rality of doctors concerned, each might well rely on the other as to 
the sending of the certificate with the unfortunate consequence 
that no certificate might in the end be sent at all. 
Enough of this rather unhappy though very interesting subject of 
criminal prosecutions; I would ask you now to transfer your atten-
tion from the dock to the witness-box which, I know, can sometimes 
seem hardly less unpleasant. In connection with this subject, I 
should like to refer to a case which, because it is only too recent, 
has not yet been reported but which may well eventually find its 
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way into the Law Reports. This the case of Balzan v Ciantar which 
my colleagues and I on the Court of Appeal decided on the 24th 
November of last year. 
No doubt you all know that nowhere are doctors really and truly 
in fantastic demand as witnesses these days as in Rent Regulation 
Board cases. You also know that doctors are being continuously 
asked - I was going to say 'pestered' - to make out certificates 
attesting that one or the other or both of the parties in a rent case 
suffer from some disease or preferably from a multiplicity of them 
as, for the purpose of the assessment of the respective 'hardship' 
of the parties, the more the diseases listed the greater appears to 
be the lessor's chance of recovering possession of his building or 
the tenant's chance of retaining it. Whilst in the old days to call a 
man 'baswi' very likely led to a case of slander, nowadays the 
parties in a rent case sport their rupture as if it were a family heir-
loom. In our procedural system a medical certificate is in principle 
of no evidential value unless the doctor who subscribed it confirms 
its contents on oath in the witness-box. 
Now in the Balzan v. Ciantar case it was contended on behalf of 
the appellant before us in the Court of Appeal that a doctor's evi-
dence as to the state of health of one of the tenants was merely an 
ex parte expression of opinion. It was stated in the judgment that a 
doctor having a person under his professional care and called by 
that person to give evidence on his behalf may be expected to testi-
fy, whenever this is relevant to the case, not only on the illness 
with which that person is affected (which has never attracted any 
objection), but also on what that particular person whose health 
background is after .all normally known ~nly to his personal doctor, 
should or should not do for the treatment cure or relief of that ill-
ness. The doctor testifies on what he himself knows about the pa-
tient as such, and this does not relate only to the illness which he 
has diagnosed, but also to what the patient, in the state of health 
in which he has been found to be, should or should not do on ac-
count of that state of health. Obviously, the Court added, both one 
and the other of these matters necessarily imply a certain subjec-
tive appreciation. But in the circumstances this is in itself inevit-
able, and, contained within proper limits, in normal circumstances 
is not procedurally wrong. May I, however, add, by way of a sad 
postscript to this, that I have at times seen medical certificates 
which looked elegantly tailor-made for the case, and some even re-
commended- that the patient should have the particular house he 
was after. 18 
Lastly I should like to say something about doctors as court ex-
perts. Mention of doctors as experts is to be found practically 
everywhere in our Law Reports. In our legal system, as you know, 
the expert is appointed by the Court itself and I feel that this sys-
tem has much to commend it. We find doctors as experts in practi-
cally all reports of criminal trials on such charges as homicide and 
bodily harm. In one such case, which was decided by the Criminal 
Court in 1955 (Vol. XXXIX, Part IV, pages 914-915 of the Law Re-
ports) the accused objected to the word tar (clear) in the phrase 
jesponuh ghall-periklu tar tal-mewt (expose the victim to a clear 
danger of death) in the medical experts' report, on the ground that 
it is exclusively for the jury to adjudicate on this factor. The 
Court, however, overruled this objection on the ground that danger 
o~ death admits of certain gradations, ranging from remote danger 
to clear danger, and in the report this was correlated with the trau-
matic effect, the study of which is a matter which falls within the 
technical competence of the medical experts. 
In civil matters, coo, there are several reported cases relating to 
doctors as experts. In particular there was a time when the Courts 
held that it was impossible to entrust experts with the examination 
of the question of the mental sanity of a person - usually a testa-
tor - who was already dead at the time (Vol. XX, Part l, page 193 
and Vol. XXIV, Pare 1, page 794 of the Law Reports). But more re-
cently (Vol. XXXIV, Part 1, pages 108 co 133) a different view has 
been taken. 
An interesting case arose in 1947 and is to be found in Vol. 
XXXIII, Pare II, pages 73-7 4 of the Law Reports. In a case of se-
paration the husband, who was the plaintiff and was alleging adul-
tery on the part of his wife, requested the Court to appoiqc medical 
experts co ascertain whether his wife, the defendant, was pregnant. 
The First Hall of the Civil Court held chat in the field of private 
law the examination of the person of any of the parties for eviden-
tial purposes was not provided for and so, in the event of opposi-
tion on the part of the person concerned, such examination was not 
admissible. 
A similar case, but with a more modern flavour, occurred in 1952 
and is reported in Vol. XXXVI, Part 1 pages 297-298 of the Law 
Reports. In a case of illegitimate filiation in which the plaintiff 
was alleging chat the defendant was the father of her illegitimate 
child, the defendant asked the Court of Appeal to appoint an ex-
pert to carry out the necessary blood test on the plaintiff in order 
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to exclude his paternity in respect of the child. The Court held 
that such a test was admissible whenever the parties consented to 
it. In this case both .the plaintiff and the defendant had in fact con· 
sented; but as the mother was appearing in the case also as curat-
rix ad /item of the child, the question arose whether in this capa-
city she could give her consent on behalf of the child. The Court 
held that as it was in the child's interest that his paternity be es-
tablished and it did not appear that the test in question could be 
prejudicial to his health, it could in the circumstances supply this 
consent itself. A similar case is at present pending before us in 
the Court of Appeal and the relevant tests are actually being car-
ried out. This, I think, evinces what I may call a prudent progres· 
siveness in the Courts' approach to certain delicate pr~blems. 
Now I should like to draw here a very firm line dividing the first 
part of my lecture dealing with doctors from the second part con-
cerning would-be doctors. But before dealing with these - and by 
would-be doctors I mean those who purport to exercise the medical 
profession without being qualified doctors - I should like to refer 
very briefly to those who, though qualified doctors, seek to exer-
cise the medical profession without having first obtained the ne-
cessary licence to practise medicine in these Islands and (since 
1959) being registered in the Medical Register, as provided in Sec-
tion 4 of the Medical and Kindred Professions Ordinance (Chap 
51). 
A reported case of a foreign doctor or rather of a Maltese with a 
foreign medical degree who practised medicine in Malta without the 
requisite licence came before our Courts in 1939 (Vol. XXX, Part 
IV, pages 637-641 of the Law Reports). A person with such a Mal-
tese surname as Mifsud, but a graduate of a French University 
without a local licence, practised medicine here and was convict· 
ed. He did not appeal against his sentence, but thought he was 
smart enough to get round it. He made arrangements with a licens-
ed Maltese doctor for the opening of consulting rooms in Strait 
Street, Valletta and the locally licensed doctor was paid three 
pounds a week apart from two shillings in respect of every patient, 
and what was left after deducting expenses went to the man who 
was referred to as the French doctor. This man was convicted of 
having contravened Section 4 of the said Ordinance (Chap. 51) and 
this time appealed against his conviction. The appellate Court 
held that it had been established in evidence that the man exa-
mined patients, made diagnoses and prescribed treatment, and that 
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this did in fact constitute the exercise of the medical profession. 
Even if he did this without payment, the offence, of the unlawful 
exercise of the medical profession would subsist as the purpose of 
gain was not a necessary ingredient of this offense, this having 
been established in the earlier case of Salunto. Nor did the pre-
sence of the licensed doctor alter the position at law for whether 
by himself or in conjunction with others, this man certainly did 
contravene the law. 
The Sal unto case referred to in this judgment, also a reported 
case (Vol. XXV, Part IV, pages 914-917 of the Law Reports), is an 
interesting one. h refers to a proper quack and a female one - not 
that female quacks are any worse than male ones. This woman ad-
mitted that she cured people by recommending or administering to 
them such innocuous ·substances as ordinary purges and that for 
this she used to get some food or a little money. The Court held 
that the offence of the unlawful exercise of the medical profession 
was not negatived by the fact that the substances prescribed or 
supplied were innocuous (indeed by relying on such supposed cure 
the 'patient' in fact usually omitted or delayed the prop er cure) or 
that the emoluments received were small. 
In another reported case (Vol. XXXII, Part IV, pages 918-922 of 
the Law Reports) a much more serious view was taken of the de-
fendant's misdeeds. A man without any professional qualifications 
posed as a medical specialist and even assured his 'patients' that 
they would be cured by him within a specified time, receiving pay-
ment for his service. With intent to make gain, he prescribed treat-
ments which were of no benefit whatever to his 'patients'. More-
over, he publicly represented himself as a doctor and even manag-
ed to figure as such in the telephone directory. Th~ appe !late 
Court held that this was not a case of a mere violation of the said 
section 4 of Chap. 51, but that there were in this case all the in-
gredients of the much more serious crime of truffa under section 
322 of the Criminal Code, including that mise en scene which is 
typical of this crime. The man was given six months in prison 
where it is hoped he had occasion to meditate on the long arm of 
the law and sort out the major from the minor offence. 
I do hope you have not found this little guided tour of our giu· 
risprudenza uninteresting. I, for one, always feel that there is a 
ring of reality about decided cases which to me at least is often 
more appealing than the writing of theoreticians. I do realize that 
I have often had co focus your acten cion on chose doctors, indeed 
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extremely few, who have fallen foul of the law and this may per-
haps on the whole have appeared to you a little dismal. But it is 
the dark side of things that brings out more fully the brighter side 
and the medical profession in Malta has indeed a very bright re-
cord. After you have heard all this, I should no.t like any of you to 
look upon the law with even the slightest degree of unfriendliness, 
for may I conclude by saying - and I firmly believe this - that the 
law is indeed the best friend of an honest man. 
DOES 'LEGAL RELATIONSHIP' CONSTITUTE 
AN IMPEDIMENT TO MARRIAGE IN MALTA? 
A. DEPASQUALE 
1. NOTION OF 'LEGAL RELATIONSHIP'. 
By 'Legal Relationship' we are here understanding specifically 
that special relationship in law that arises between an adopter and 
the person adopted by him in any way which, according to the laws 
of the country, constitutes a true legal adoption. This special re-
lationship lies in the fact that, once legal adoption has truly taken 
place to the full satisfaction of the law, in the eyes of the law in 
most respects and almost as a general rule the adopted child as-
sumes the same relationship to the adopter (or adopting spouses) 
as any child born in lawful marriage bears to his parents. 
2. 'LEGAL RELATIONSHIP' IN THE LAW OF MALTA REGARDING MARRIAG-
ES. 
The Civil Code of Malta, while regulating the rights and duties 
arising from validly contracted Marriage together with such other 
civil effects as filiation and parent.al authority does not say how 
Marriage is to be validly celebrated in Malta. It fails to make any 
provisions either about the formalities required in its celebration 
or about the essential requisites on the part of the spouses con-
tracting Marriage that could affect its validity. 
It is, however, the constant doctrine and practice of our Civil 
Courts to require that marriages celebrated in Malta between par- · 
ties of whom at least one is a member of the Catholic <;burch be 
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